“The humanitarian situation in the eastern provinces of the Democratic Republic of Congo has deteriorated dramatically in the last months. In South Kivu, an estimated 536,880 people are currently displaced from their homes. There is a continuous rise of the number of displaced in areas such as Kalehe territory (on the border with North Kivu), Kabare territory and Shabunda territory. Some displacements are caused by FARDC-RDF joint operations in North Kivu while others are caused by FARDC-MONUC operations (or Kimia II) launched in South Kivu. Since the launch of the military campaigns about six months ago, an estimated total of more than 1.5 million people have been displaced in North and South Kivu provinces and the total number of IDPs in the country currently stands at 2 millions”.

Download the full report here.

“I understand the world feels guilty about what happened in Rwanda in 1994,” said Denis Mukwege, the lead doctor at Panzi Hospital, referring to Rwanda’s genocide. “But shouldn’t the world feel guilty about what’s happening in Congo today?”

Lax (adjective): lacking care, attention or control; not severe or strong enough:
He took a gun through baggage control to highlight the lax security.
The subcommittee contends that the authorities were lax in investigating most of the cases.

(Cambridge English Dictionary)

Lizzie Parsons uses this word in her last post at The Huffington Post:

For too long, companies, and governments of countries where they are based, have played a game of see-no-evil, hear-no-evil. They have chosen to ignore the blatant links between their trade and the atrocities in eastern DRC, allowing commercial interests to override the most basic human rights. It is time to challenge these attitudes and to start holding these companies to account.

Read more here.

I have just read this Reuter´s dispatch:

KIGALI, July 27 (Reuters) - Rwanda is prepared to take part in further joint military operations in the Democratic Republic of Congo to root out rebels operating there, President Paul Kagame said on Monday.

Congolese and Rwandan soldiers launched a joint operation in January against Hutu militia known as FDLR who took part in Rwanda’s 1994 genocide, and who are also seen as a root cause of 15 years of festering conflict in eastern Congo.

Rwanda pulled out a month later and the rebels retook ground they lost during the offensive.

“We continue to be ready to work on solutions … including military operations… at short notice,” Kagame said”.

(…)

“The relationship between Rwanda and DRC has been improving very fast. I’d say it’s now at a good level. We want not only to keep it there, but also to advance it …. for the good of the people of the whole region,” Kagame told a news conference.

(…)

“Laurent Nkunda is not the problem in DRC. He’s a very small part of the problem. We need to look beyond him to the bigger issues,” Kagame said.

(…)

Some analysts have recommended that the two governments negotiate with FDLR members not wanted for genocide.

“They say, ‘talk to the FDLR’, but which one? Moderates? If they were moderates they would have returned home,” Kagame said”.

Yesterday I spent the afternoon with a group of friends who had just returned from Rwanda. They had the opportunity to talk to several people. According to them, most of the people they found there live in fear.

Another friend of mine spent a few days in Rwanda recently. He had the impression that the country was “on the move”, economically speaking. However, he said that no one wanted to talk to him on the political situation. “Last time I came, people told me something about how things are going. This time it was impossible“.

“There are even dilapidated court buildings in towns large and small, but, a lawyer tells us over dinner, with great feeling, “I’ve never, ever, seen a judge who wasn’t corrupt.” This is so routine, he and a colleague explain, that in civil disputes, the judge gets a percentage of the property value that the bribe-payer gains. People in such positions are then expected to send some of the take back up the line to those who appointed them; this is called “renvoyer l’ascenseur”—sending back the elevator. Being a judge in an area full of mining rights disputes is particularly lucrative. Other civil servants also earn extra: Goma is on the border with Rwanda, and one of the lawyers explains that the very hotel where we’re having dinner was built by a customs official. They point along the street to two more hotels owned by customs men.

(…)

A curious, very limited kind of pressure is being applied. Underlying the army’s long-standing practice of looting civilian goods and food is that soldiers often don’t get paid. “The money comes from Kinshasa,” a UN official explains, “then goes to Kisangani”—a city three quarters of the way to the eastern border—”and by the time it gets down to company level there’s not much left.” To deal with this problem, the European Union has sent a fifty-five-man military mission here.

One member is Bob Arnst, a short, wiry man with a crew cut, who is a sergeant major in the Dutch army. He is stationed in Bunia, and talks about his work one evening in the UN’s café and recreation center, where a security guard at the gate has the job of keeping out local prostitutes.

“Everything is in cash. They bring the money in big packages, 120 by 80 by 20 centimeters. In great bricks. We’re expecting a convoy now. When the money arrives, they count it again, bill by bill.” Arnst and two French soldiers watch the count at the local army headquarters, after which paymasters from half a dozen battalions arrive in SUVs to collect the funds for their units. “Most of them [the paymasters] have very nice clothing. Once a colonel showed up with his bodyguard and I asked, ‘What are you doing here?’ And he said, ‘I’ve come to see where my money is.’ And I said, ‘It’s not your money.’”

In the days following, Arnst and his French colleagues visit Congolese battalions in the field, usually dropping in by surprise in a UN helicopter. “We ask soldiers, ‘Did you get your payment?’”

And if they didn’t? On three occasions in the last few months, entire units were not paid. Arnst reported each case to his EU superiors in Kinshasa, and a Dutch colonel applied pressure at the Ministry of Defense. Each time, the commander was forced to turn over the money to his troops—but was not arrested or disciplined.

(…)

Read the full article here.

These are quotes of the latest Global Witness report on the Militarisation of Mining in the DRC, Faced With A Gun What Can you Do?

Thank God that we have Global Witness.

In their Own Words

Quotes from Global Witness Report . All quotes below are from interviews carried out by Global Witness in North and South Kivu (eastern DRC) unless otherwise stated.

Involvement of the Congolese army in the exploitation of minerals

“When you’re faced with a gun, what can you do, as a simple civilian? [...] They ask for money [...] They ask for gold or cassiterite. Whatever happens, you have to give it.” – A miner from Shabunda (South Kivu) describing extortion at military roadblocks. Bukavu, 28 July 2008.

“If a person has a rank in the army, he has access to natural resources.” – UN official, Goma, 22 July 2008.

“Please tell the government to tell the military to stop this. The population is suffering.” – Miner in Tubimbi (South Kivu), 29 July 2008.

“They don’t want to leave because of the minerals [...] All the commanders send money back from the minerals to the provincial commander [...] Everyone knows what is happening but no one dares to say it.” – UN official, Bukavu, 28 July 2008.

“You can’t export fraudulently if you don’t have the support of the army [...] The state itself has destroyed all the structures of the state [...] Fraud is the rule.” – Senior civil servant, Bukavu, 28 July 2008.

“There is a mineshaft people call ‘10th military region’. No one can touch it.” – Congolese researcher describing the gold mining area of Mushinga (South Kivu). Bukavu, 25 July 2008.

“Soldiers never mine [...] It is not possible” – Captain Musa Kyabele Freddy, commander of the 2nd company of the 12th integrated FARDC battalion, Tubimbi (South Kivu), 29 July 2009.

Involvement of the FDLR in the exploitation of minerals

“They don’t want to leave because of the natural wealth. They are like bees swarming on honey. They prefer to die there.” – Resident of Bukavu, referring to the FDLR, 26 July 2008.

“The Congolese can’t set up business in competition with the FDLR. They may just sell minerals which belong to the FDLR. The FDLR are becoming very rich. They have been sitting on these minerals for 14 years”. – Human rights activist from South Kivu discussing the FDLR’s control of the mineral trade, 25 July 2008.

“If a mine is discovered by the population, the FDLR come and take it over [...] No one can stop them. People just observe.” – Member of Congolese non-governmental organisation, Goma, 22 July 2008.
“People simply can’t refuse to work for them” – Member of Congolese NGO describing the relationship between the FDLR and Congolese civilians, Bukavu, 24 July 2008.

“We are their meat, their animals. We have nothing to say.” – A miner from Shabunda, subjected to extortion at FDLR roadblocks during his 340-km trek from Shabunda to Bukavu on foot, Bukavu, 28 July 2008.

“We are only involved in agricultural activities [...] It is totally false that the FDLR are involved in mining in this area. All we do is buy things like soap.” Commander of an FDLR brigade in South Kivu, Luvungi, 31 July 2008.

Collusion between the Congolese army and the FDLR

“The collaboration is quasi-official.” Human rights activist, Goma, 8 August 2008.

“[The FDLR] just want guarantees of security [...]. You have to get to know them and get to know their reality here [...]. God did this – made for them to be in an area where there are natural resources. Otherwise [...] people would have died.” Senior army official speaking in a personal capacity, Bukavu, 30 July 2008.

“[The FARDC and the FDLR] don’t attack each other. Where both are present, they share the spoils and both extort from the population.” Human rights activist, Bukavu, 27 July 2008.

“[In certain areas, the FDLR] are stronger and more numerous than the FARDC [...] They are masters of the place.” NGO representative from Bukavu, 21 July 2008.

“The FARDC have to go through FDLR areas. They negotiate with each other. They agree not to attack each other. They respect each other’s zones. They each administer their own zones and collect ‘taxes’.” – Congolese researcher explaining the arrangements between the FARDC and FDLR in strategic locations in Shabunda (South Kivu). Bukavu, 25 July 2008.

Involvement of other armed groups in the exploitation of minerals

“The mai-mai take everything. They don’t give anything to the miners.” – Local development worker discussing mai-mai involvement in gold mining in Mukera, near Fizi, Baraka, 2 August 2008.

Traders

“We all end up buying minerals which, in some way, have been produced illegally. You can’t just ask us to stop. We have no alternatives other than closing.” – Representative of a comptoir (mineral trading company), Goma, 9 August 2008.

“Everyone knows who the FDLR intermediaries are but they won’t say in case it implicates them. The FARDC are also involved. Everyone, including the authorities, is involved [...] They all know each other but won’t say [their names]. But we know which comptoirs they sell to [...]” – UN official, speaking about the relationship between traders and armed groups. Bukavu, 28 July 2008.

“The comptoirs are seen everywhere around the mines.” – Official of a humanitarian agency, Goma, 7 August 2008.
“Your hypothesis according to which we should verify the exact origin of every kilo of exported material is inappropriate in the current context in Congo.” – Letter to Global Witness from F. Muylaert of Belgian
company Trademet, 22 January 2009.

At the international level

“Natural resources are not on the table of topics in peace talks. Almost every other issue is. Yet it’s one of the keys to resolution of the conflict.” – UN official, Goma, 22 July 2008.

“European and Asian companies, including Bangkok-based THAISARCO (a subsidiary of British metals group AMC), UK-based Afrimex, and Belgium-based Trademet have been buying minerals from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) that are funding armed groups and fuelling conflict, said Global Witness in a report published today.
The 110-page report, entitled ‘Faced with a gun, what can you do?’, details how companies are buying from suppliers who trade in minerals from the warring parties. Many mining areas in eastern DRC are controlled by rebels and the national army, who violently exploit civilians to retain access to valuable minerals, including cassiterite (tin ore), coltan and gold. Cassiterite and coltan are used to make mobile phones, computers and other electronics, among other things.
Global Witness wrote to 200 companies and found that most had no controls in place to stop ‘conflict minerals’ entering their supply chain. It says governments, including the UK and Belgium, are undermining their own development assistance and diplomatic efforts to end the 12-year conflict by failing to crack down on companies based within their borders.
Informed by on-the-ground investigations and interviews in North and South Kivu, the report reveals that despite being on opposing sides, the national Congolese army and rebel groups, in particular the FDLR, regularly cooperate with each other, carving up territory and occasionally sharing the spoils of illegal mining. It warns that the recent integration of another armed group, the CNDP, into the national army will make it easier for the former rebels to get ‘in on the act’ of exploiting the mines.
“Despite recent political and military developments, including the apparent rapprochement between the DRC and Rwanda, violence against unarmed civilians is continuing and countless lives are lost each day. All the warring parties in the DRC are systematically using forced labour and violent extortion in mining areas,” said Patrick Alley, Director of Global Witness”.

Find all the information here.

(…)”The armed groups and military units controlling many mining areas are carrying out horrific human rights abuses against the civilian population. As we write to you, brutal attacks against unarmed civilians in North and South Kivu are on the increase. Those responsible for the violence include the Forces démocratiques pour la libération du Rwanda (FDLR) and soldiers of the Congolese national army – both of whom are heavily involved in mining and trading in cassiterite (tin ore), coltan and gold. Without sources of funding derived from the mineral trade, it is doubtful that groups such as the FDLR would be able to sustain their operations at the current level” (…).

Read more here.

The European Union has recently reaffirmed its “commitment” towards peace  in Eastern Congo.

I have been living in Goma for the last nine months, and I have seen the fruits of Western diplomacy in the field. However, if peace is supposed to be the ultimate goal, I have doubts about current strategies in this region.

Any civilian from Ufamandu, Masisi, would understand what I mean.

In spite of its supposed goodwill, I am afraid that part of the diplomatic strategy in place  is actually fuelling violence. As a European, I am very sorry to say this.

In october 2008, CNDP forces were threatening to take Goma, North Kivu. An advocacy campaign was launched by many international NGOs (headed by Oxfam) for the deployment of a EU force in the Kivus. On the basis of their experience, these NGOs understood that a EU force deployment was the only option to protect civilians, because:

-FARDC forces were (and are) much more of a problem than a solution. Many of their soldiers systematically rape and humiliate women. They treat civilians as pack mules to carry their belongings. They are endemically not paid, and hence they loot and extort civilian population on a daily basis. To put it in another way, you can not ask the fox to take care of the chicken.

-MONUC does not fullfill its job of protection. The mandate is there (Chapter 7), but there is no political will to exercise the use of force. Countries sending blue helmets do not want casualties. And blue helmets are deployed, yes, but too many times they stay in their barracks and do not protect the people in need. It happened in Kiwanja: CNDP killed hundreds of civilians at literally a stone´s throw from the MONUC position, and blue helmets did not move. It happens in Masisi: local people from  Masisi centre explained me recently this same behaviour. Blue helmets stay in their barracks, they rarely get out. They all seem to be counting the days to leave each position. And examples of this behaviour keep on taking place (read the last one here).

With these two forces as main guarantors of civilian safety, you understand better why NGOs were pushing so hard for a EU force deployment.

Just after the CNDP threatened to take to Goma, in October last year, the EU seemed to react.  Bernard Kouchner and David Milliband came to the Kivus and expressed their commitment to the people of Goma. And Gordon Brown himself talked publicly about the women of the Kivus (“Women of the Kivus, we do not forget you”, he said). So many of us thought: “Hey, these guys seem to be doing something”.

However, no EU force was sent. CNDP kept on controlling a vast region of Masisi and Rutshuru and they seemed unstoppable. Pessimism and deception were growing, because nothing was happening (around February), and many started to wonder: “they are the leaders of the free world… aren´t they supposed to do something?”.

Then, in January, all of a sudden and to the astonishment of all experts, the political situation turned 180º.  CNDP and PARECO abandoned fighting, Nkunda was arrested (by Rwanda!) and both Rwanda and the DRC joined forces in a military operation, Umoja Wetu (“Our Unity”), to put an end to the FDLR in the Kivus. Diplomatic commitment and international pressure were giving its fruits after months of talks.

Since March, it seems clearer and clearer that, far from solving problems, the current strategy actually creates havoc, as it  presents serious deficiencies in its very own foundations:

-The belief that a military operation can eliminate FDLR forces proved to be wrong, as everyone has acknowledged. Far from solving the issue, Umoja Wetu created more suffering. Once again, civilians paid the price of being between the sword and the wall and suffered FDLR retaliation.

The problem is, a military operation of similar characteristics (Kimya II) is about to start in South Kivu. In spite of the human rights records of the FARDC, MONUC is going to support it logistically.

MONUC collaboration with an army responsible of human rights violations (FARDC) seriously deteriorates the image of the UN and makes it accomplice of the atrocities.

In fact, the UN presence in the DRC has developed a schizofrenic nature. On the one hand, you have those who support militarily the FARDC in the field (MONUC). And on the other hand, in the very same organization, you have those who arrive later to pick up the pieces (OCHA, UNHCR, WFP). In other words, they are serving God and the Devil. Many UN humanitarian officials are aware of this and deplore this collaboration. Many consider it shameful and against the principles of impartiality and independence the UN is supposed to stand for.

-The presentation of the FDLR problem as a purely military issue is wrong, and those who present it like that are aware of this. It is political as well as military. The EU knows it, but it has proven to be deliberately, strategically, blind regarding the political situation in Rwanda. As Filip Reyntjens denounced, the report of EU electoral observers in the last Rwandan municipal elections was manipulated, precisely to avoid what it was supposed to do: provide an accurate diagnosis of  the degree of transparency of these elections.

MONUC supporting FARDC, the EU manipulating reports…  the word “commitment” reveals new meanings I had not think of.

This is the figure of IDPs in North Kivu estimated by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). You can check the file here.

Nine hundred eighty eight thousand six hundred and twenty nine men, women and children living in deplorable conditions. Most of them without access to humanitarian assistance of any kind: no food, no water and sanitation, no plastic sheetings. Nothing.

988,629. Higher than the population of Detroit.

988,629. Higher than the population of Marseille.

988,629. Almost equal to the population of Birmingham.

70,661 of these IDPs live here in Goma. Very few of the rest are assisted  in Masisi, Lubero, Walikale or Rutshuru.

Many IDPs keep on coming from Walilkale towards Goma. And many of those who decide to return do not go back to their place of origin, but to a place close enough to their home, where they wait and see. That was the case of an old man I met in a camp two weeks ago.

The Polish newspaper Rzeczpospolita recently published a set of great photos of IDPs in Goma.

The worst of all is that all these men, women and children are almost completely forgotten by the rest of the world. The conflict does not make the headlines, no matter what may happen.

A few days ago, a three-year-old girl from South Kivu was victim of a brutal rape by armed men and died as a result of injuries. I think this is important news. I would like to find it in the websites of the main world newspapers. But it is not there, and I don´t understand why. Maybe editors consider this degree of barbarism too much for their sites.

Or maybe they simply think it´s not interesting.

“While we commend the ICTR for vigorously prosecuting numerous perpetrators of the 1994 genocide, we are deeply concerned that the failure to indict a single RPF soldier for killing civilians causes the Tribunal to be dismissed as “victor’s justice,” sets a dangerous precedent for future international prosecutions, and undermines efforts at achieving peace, security, and reconciliation in Rwanda and the Great Lakes region as a whole”.

This reminds me the words of a Spanish writer regarding the end of the Spanish Civil war. He affirmed that, once the war was over, it was not peace that came but Victory, with a capital “V”.

Read more here.

I took these two testimonies today in an IDP camp in the outskirts of Goma.

Silvie (45 years old).

“I came from Kiniangutu town, Masisi, in January 2008. We escaped me and my five children.
Life in the camps is very difficult. IDPs are neglected. When we were given the plastic sheeting we were told that they would change it every six months. It´s been two years with the same sheeting now. When it rains we get wet. The NFI they gave us are used and we sleep on the rocks.
The food we receive, 6 kg per person, is completely insufficient. In my town of origin this was the ration for one day.

War continues in my place of origin. The FDLR is there. People from Nyabiondo, as well as from Ufamandu, come and tell me how things are going over there.
My children here in the camp are 13, 11 and 8 years old. Two others are in a host family in Goma.
My husband died five years ago, in the war. We were in our field. The FDLR came and took him as prisoner. Since then, I have not seen him anymore. Although I have not seen his body, I think he is dead. When they take the people they ask them to carry things and later they kill them. I heard news that they had burned our house.
Here in the camp there are people that returned to Mweso and Kashuga and then came back because they realized there was no security. Kalembe, for instance, is an empty town, there is no one there. Everyone from Kalembe is now in Mweso.
There are places where people can return, though, like Sake.
We want peace in order to return home. Here they give us corn flower, something which we don´t eat at home. We used it at home just to make a beverage and we find ourselves eating it here as main dish”.

***

Alain (50 years old)

“I come from Ufamandu, in Masisi. There is people there being killed right now, while you and me are talking. People are killed just like that. All these people doing evil hide in the forests in our place of origin.Too many people in our town are armed.
The living conditions in the camps are terrible. We don´t receive enough food. It comes late and it´s not enough.
We would like to return because the living conditions in the camps are very bad. The sheetings are old. But when we ask for them no one cares.

I am an IDP since 1995. First, I left Ufamandu towards Walikale. Then, in 1996, I had to flee to Bukavu. Later to Minova (98) and then Kiroche (2000). In 2006 I had to leave again. All my goods were taken and I escaped to Goma by boat.
I have always fled with my wife and children. My nine children are here in the camp. The youngest is 2 years old and the oldest is 19.
I can return, but where? People return but after civilians start to suffer again. Once we harvest, it is normal that armed men (FDLR, thieves, looters) come at night and take everything.
My younger brothers arrived from Ufamandu three days ago with their families. Between the 9th and 13th, three members of their family were killed: two young girls aged 19 and 17, and a boy of 11. They were at home when robbers came and killed them with machetes. They arrived here on the 24th. They are temporarily in a neighbourhood in Goma.

People from Sake, Karuba, Matanda, Minova… can return home. But I can´t”.

UN Security Council Should Demand Government Hold Soldiers Responsible

This is a photo of Buhimba IDP camp taken from a hill in March 2009. There are three other camps of approximately the same dimensions in the outskirts of Goma: Mugunga I, Mugunga II and Bulengo

Source: Pole Institute

Le ” pillage ” est devenu l’expression la plus courante de l’insécurité ambiante dans les milieux ruraux et sur les routes du Nord Kivu. Dans les villages, le pillage est une razzia organisée par une bande de malfaiteurs qui surprennent les habitants dans leur sommeil et leur extorquent tous leurs biens : argent, habits, cochons, poules, sacs de vivres, etc. Sur les routes, c’est au détour d’un virage, parfois entre deux positions militaires, que les véhicules de transport en commun (souvent des camions qui transportent les citoyens et leurs biens) sont ” pillés ” par des hommes armés qui se fondent par la suite dans les brousses avec leur butin. A Kiwanja et sur les routes qui y mènent, le pillage fait partie du quotidien. Lors de ces opérations, la moindre résistance face aux ” pilleurs ” peut déboucher sur un drame. Le cas de Déo, cet habitant de Kachemu blessé par balle pour n’avoir pas cédé ” de bonne foi ” (” na esprit ya bien “) son téléphone portable, n’est pas un cas isolé. Les ” pilleurs ” n’hésitent pas à tirer mortellement sur des individus pour terroriser les survivants et les soumettre à leurs exigences. Le Père Cantor, curé de la paroisse catholique de Rutshuru, a lui aussi été attaqué par balles en plein jour alors qu’il rentrait d’une mission pastorale de routine. Avec deux balles dans le corps, il a pu rouler jusqu’au centre de santé le plus proche ; sa vie ne serait pas en danger.
Mais les assassinats ne sont pas toujours associés aux pillages des villages ; ils sont aussi utilisés à des fins politiques, soit pour marquer les territoires, soit pour punir certaines personnes accusées de collaboration avec l’ennemi. Dans le territoire de Rutshuru, des policiers de la Police nationale congolaise, dont le Commandant de Nyabanira, ont été assassinés au courant du mois de mars 2009 par des FDLR présumés.

To read the full text, click here.

Executive summary (to read the full report, click here).

Ever since the eruption of the second Congo war in August 1998, the mining sector in eastern DRC has been under the scrutiny of UN Sanctions Committees, academics, NGOs, and local and international media, who have been worried and disturbed by the links between natural resource exploitation and armed conflict in the region. Both state and non-state armed actors are deriving benefit from the local mining business by levying taxes on mineral exports, by selling minerals for their own profit, and by trading mining rights for financial and military support.

The present report aims to clarify the position and responsibility of Belgian mineral traders in the area. Our purpose is not only to shed more light on the activities of Trademet and Traxys, the two companies featuring in the latest UN report, but also to discuss the activities of two other companies that have received less attention so far, namely Services and Trading International (STI) and Société pour le Développement et l’Expansion d’Entreprises (SDE).

In the first part of our report, we offer a description of the context in which the mineral trade takes place. We discuss the current state of affairs in the global trade in tin and tantalum, present an outline of the mineral trade in the Kivu region and give a brief description of the local security situation. In the second part of our report, we concentrate on the involvement of Belgian traders in the mineral business of eastern DRC. Our main intention is to provide the reader with a profile of each of these traders. As far as possible, we also present some information on the Congolese suppliers of the Belgian traders.

This paper aims to feed the ongoing debate on the accountability of commercial stakeholders in eastern DRC and on possible solutions to break the link between the mineral trade and the financing of armed actors. IPIS agrees with most observers that a total embargo on mineral exports from eastern DRC would not only be impracticable, but also detrimental to the livelihoods of the local population and hence the security situation in the region. However, this does not imply that commercial stakeholders are not to be held accountable if their activities have, directly or indirectly, financed rebel movements. IPIS also believes that governments of countries where international mineral traders are established can play an advisory and sensitizing role vis-à-vis these companies with regard to their liabilities under international and national criminal law when they operate in a conflict zone such as eastern DRC. This would also enhance such governments’ credibility as peace-brokers in the region and adjust the persistent perception among many local stakeholders that foreign business interests are more valuable than peace.

Our research findings show that Traxys and Trademet in 2007/2008 were by far the most important foreign buyers of cassiterite and coltan in Goma and Bukavu. One would suspect that, given their economic prominence and long-standing presence in the region, they would not only have a privileged knowledge of the local commodity chain, but also considerable leverage to influence it in a positive manner. The traders concerned reacted defensively to accusations laid out in the December 2008 report of the UN Panel of Experts. The Panel asserted that, through certain suppliers (comptoirs), they knowingly purchased minerals from mines controlled by non-state armed groups such as the FDLR. During our investigation we have unfortunately not been in a position to confirm or deny such claims through documented evidence. Nevertheless, we deplore that 13 years after the start of the first Congo war, such naming and shaming exercises still seem to be necessary to prompt a more transparent and constructive engagement on behalf of commercial stakeholders in the region.

Looking forward, however, there are indications that the traders under scrutiny are willing to contribute in a more pro-active manner to a sustainable solution to the issue of conflict related minerals. This creates a window of opportunity for all stakeholders to become involved in a concerted effort to enhance transparency and accountability in the mineral sector of the eastern DRC.

In our view, a crucial first step forward is to create a transparent, publicly accessible and regularly updated database with reliable information on the local commodity chain. IPIS is currently laying the groundwork of such a database through a pilot project in the Kivus. To further protect the legitimate trade, which, we repeat, is vital for the socio-economic fabric and security of the region, a credible traceability system should be devised. While there seems to be a preparedness among certain local stakeholders to step up due diligence efforts, even if it involves a third party verification mechanism, one should realize that in the long term such efforts can only be successful if they are supported by the Congolese government, MONUC, multi- and bilateral donors, and the DRC’s neighbors. The crux of the matter is the huge challenge the Congolese authorities face as far as controlling the eastern part of the country is concerned. To achieve this, security sector reform and regional political cooperation of course are key. In the case of the mineral sector, donors should support a strong deployment of mandated state agencies such as the CEEC, SAESSCAM, OFIDA and the Mines Administration.

(From IPS – Thalif Deen 12 May 2009)

New York — The military conflicts raging across Africa, Asia and Latin America have been significantly influenced by the heavy flow of illicit small arms, cocaine and rich minerals.

The report, titled ‘Air Transport and Destabilizing Commodity Flows,’ points out that some U.N. missions have continued to contract aviation services from companies that have been named in Security Council reports for wholly illicit arms movement and have been recommended by the United Nations for a complete aviation ban.

To download the executive summary, click here.

To download the full report, click here.

Last May 10th there was an attack to FARDC forces in Busiringi. Even though an AFP dispatch talked about 60 people killed, it is still uncertain how many people died. OCHA estimates that a big part of the 15,000 people living in this town ran for their lives towards Hombo Nord. The day before, the town of Butalongola (6 Km south Kanyabayonga, axe Nyanzale) was attacked, allegedly by the FDLR. Around 135 houses were burned and 2 FARDC soldiers were killed. OCHA updates the humanitarian community about the security situation every Friday.

More than two months after the departure of Rwandan armed Forces from the Kivus, the UN Peacekeeping Mission continues to fail in its mission to protect civilians. Insecurity is particulary rampant in areas such as South Lubero.

Unfortunately, 60 people killed in the bush in Busiringi is not a figure high enough to attract world attention. It would not be the same if this number of civilians had been killed almost anywhere else. Busiringi, however, does not exist. It does not make world headlines, as CNDP´s offensive towards Goma did last October.

So nothing happens.

A few days ago, the International Crisis Group released a report in which five priorities were stressed:

“A peacebuilding strategy for the Congo should have five priorities: credible and comprehensive disarmament strategy for dealing with Rwandan Hutu rebels in both North and South Kivu; reform of the security sector; fostering reconciliation and human security; political engagement dedicated to improving governance; and continuing efforts to sustain stabile regional relations”.

Perhaps all the five priorities can be resumed into one: political will.

You can find the full article here (in Spanish)

DRC: Uncertain future for the Kivus after the return of Rwandan troops

*Nicolás Dorronsoro

More than one month after the exit of Rwandan troops from the DRC, the harsh reality of Congolese civilians has far from improved in the great part of the territories of North and South Kivu. In January, an extraordinary diplomatic turn in the relations between Rwanda and the DRC translated into the capture of Laurent Nkunda and a joint operation (known as Umoja Wetu, “our unity”) between the Congolese Armed Forces (FARDC) and the Rwandan army to put an end to the FDLR presence in Congolese soil. The expectations created were many, mainly the phisical elimination of FDLR in only one month and the extradition of Laurent Nkunda to the DRC. The risks of the operation were also high: according to recent history, a no return of Rwandan forces after the given period was a real possibility.

Six weeks after, reality on the ground has put an end to temporary optimism and brought us back to the known scenario of chronical unstability and impunity in the region. After the exit of Rwandan troops, insecurity reigns in the most part of the territory. Last April 7^th, Oxfam affirmed that the situation in the Kivus is nowadays as bad as in 2008. There are many reasons for that judgment: Human Rights Watch recently affimed that the Rwandan armed forces and its allies have raped at least ninety women in January and have also been involved in the killings of at least one hundred and eighty civilians. The attacks to humanitarian organisations in North Kivu are on the rise: five incidents in January, thirteen in February and sixteen in March. As OCHA informs, the last five incidents registered just in the first week of April (two assaults and three ambushes) confirm this tendency. And due to the non payment of salaries, FARDC lootings towards civilian population are increasing: the pillage for the last months in the area known as Grand Nord has been systematic. Facing this reality, the UN Special Representative for the Democratic Republic of Congo, Alan Doss, told the Security Council last April 10^th that the hope for peace in the Kivus was still facing “considerable” difficulties.

Up to now, the reality on the field show that the joint operation FARDC- Rwandan army did not achieve its goals. Rwandan troops abandoned Goma on February 27^th . Even though the US embassy in Kinshasa promptly judged the operation as a “real success”, the outcomes declared by the Congolese general heading the operation, John Numbi, talked by themselves. 89 casualties and 140 surrenders into FDLR seemed a scarce butiny, given that this armed group is estimated in at least 4,000 men. Far from being dismantled, nowadays it seems clear that the FDLR forces retreated and hid in the forest, n order to return once the Rwandan armed forces had abandoned the territory. A few days ago, in towns such as Kitbwabaluzi, in Mwenga (South Kivu), the FDLR sent a request to the population to leave the town to avoid future combat with the FARDC.

It is interesting to point out that just one week after the retreat of Rwandan forces from North Kivu, the US company Contour Global announced an investment of U$ 325 million in Rwanda (the highest in Rwandan history) in order to extract gas from Lake Kivu and produce electricity. It is inevitable to think that the US administration has used the policy of the stick and the carrot with Kagame´s regime.

While diplomatic progress between the DRC and Rwanda continues (Rwanda will reopen its embassy in Kinshasa in about three months), the gap between progress in a macro level and the reality of civilians on the ground does not cease to grow. Massive human rights violations suffered daily by Congolese civilians in North and South Kivu clearly show that two key issues to put an end to violence -the complete reform of the Congolese army and police, and the FDLR issue- are far from being solved. The first one shows that the main problem affecting the DRC in the East is bad governance and the unability to maintain the monopoly of violence. The second deserves a small reflection.

Since the diplomatic offensive headed by the US and the UK brought about an approach between the DRC and Rwanda, the only discourse regarding the FDLR has been that of immediate surrender and complete military defeat. No one dares to talk about the possibility of a negotiation, no matter how limited it may be, with this group. This seems surprising if we take into consideration that the country the FDLR aspire to return to suffers from an extraordinary democratic deficit.

Last March 19^th, the American human rights expert Ruth Wedgwood affirmed at the UN Human Rights Comittee that forming a political party in Rwanda today seems virtually impossible . Wedgwood made an interesting reflection: she reminded that hutu factions responsible for the genocide had been capable of fostering the massacre because they had nourished the fear of hutu population being oppressed and marginalized. Unfortunately, and leaving aside the economic sucess Rwanda is undoubtedly experiencing, that feared scenario seem to be similar to actual Rwanda, according to many experts. Filip Reyntjens, Professor in the University of Antwerp and one of the most respected scholars in the Great Lakes region, recently affirmed that not only the last local elections in Rwanda were manipulated, but even the report of the EU electoral observers itself, which considered them as valid. Given this democratic deficit, organizations like the European Network for Central Africa (EURAC), have advocated for a political negociation with the FDLR. However, this issue continues to be a taboo.

Regarding the CNDP, the agreements between this armed group and the Congolese government made public recognized the former as a political party and provided an amnesty to its members (let us remember that the CNDP leader, Bosco Ntaganda, is searched by the ICC under the accusation of crimes against humanity). This agreement shows once more that impunity is the prize to pay in this region. It is also worrying that the signed agreements speak about return of the IDPs (volontary, at least) in a month, precisely when the FDLR has returned to its areas of influence. We must add to this that the presence of uncontrolled CNDP elements in the areas formerly under their official authority has meant an important increase of insecurity. Due to all this, most part of the IDPs in Goma are now prudent regarding a possible return, particularly to Masisi (even though in some areas such as Sake and part of Rutshuru the situation has clearly improved). The former CNDP leader, Laurent Nkunda, continues in Rwanda in a status close to house arrest and his extradition to the DRC remains pending.

While the FARDC prepare a new operation against the FDLR, a big part of the territory continues in a neither-peace-nor-war condition. Even though the protection needs of civilians are urgent, the blue helmet force in the territory remains unsufficient as the envoy of 3,000 additional soldiers approved four months ago by the UN Security Council has not arrived. In the short term, the predictable uncapability of the FARDC to put a militar end to the FDLR could set the ground for a second phase of the operation Umoja Wetu. The future will tell us if this operation has just been an isolated move or the prelude for the begginning of a consolidation (or not) of a Rwandan presence in the Kivus.

*Nicolás Dorronsoro - Journalist and Humanitarian worker in Sub-saharan Africa since 2002. MA in International Relations (Instituto Ortega y Gasset), MSc Political Sociology (LSE). Colaborator of the Spanish Institute of Studies on Conflicts and Humanitarian Action (IECAH).

The Crisis States research centre at the London School of Economics (LSE) has just released a report on mining in Eastern Congo. The report mainly argues that banning or disrupting the regional trade in minerals from Eastern DR Congo would be counterproductive, as it would “put up to one million livelihoods at risk and perpetuate insecurity”.

You can download the full report here.

On March 2nd, the US based company Contour Global announced the investment of 325 million U$ to develop a gas extraction and electricity generation facility which “will provide 100 MW of natural gas fired electricity to Rwanda and the East African Region”. According to Contour Global, this is the biggest investment in the history of Rwanda (you can download the press release here).

The Rwandan army finished the joint military operation and left Congolese soil on February 27th.

Of course, both news have no link to each other.

Refugees International, a Washington based advocacy organization specialized on refugee issues, released a report on March the 3rd on the situation in the Kivus. These are their main conclusions on the recent joint military operation against the FDLR:

The attempted military solution to the FDLR appears far from having succeeded in crippling the rebel group, despite the recent disarmament of over 400 combatants by MONUC. Instead, the operations led to serious consequences for the Congolese in North and South Kivu, including significant new displacements (…)

Not many organizations say publicly that the joint military operation has not been a success. I agree 100% with their analysis.

Refugees International also makes the point on the importance of dialogue as the only path for a durable solution to the FDLR presence in the DRC. Eurac expressed the same opinion a few weeks ago. Military solutions to political problems are, in most of the cases, a recipe for disaster.

You can download the full report here.

I read a beautiful story a few days ago. It is like a new chapter of  The West Wing, the wonderful TVseries where a decent and capable man,  who studied in LSE and won the Nobel Price for Economics, rules the most powerful country on Earth and tries to be a force for good.

In this beautiful chapter, the President of the United States and his new administration do care about human rights, have a great operating knowledge of the problems of the people in North Kivu, and use their power to change the situation for better.  The plot shows how Congolese authorities visiting Washington are happily impressed by the new administration´s knowledge of the conflict. They are listened, and the new men in Washington are remarkably able to open a dialogue process. They put an end to CNDP, ensure the normalization of the relationship between the DRC and Rwanda…  and the first stone for a durable end to violence is in place.

Sounds like Alice in Wonderland, but this is mainly what Colette Braeckmann says in her last post. The text has been widely visited and traduced.

I guess that in the following chapters of this unexpected new season of the West Wing, the IDPs start to return home.

Colette Braeckmann is not no matter who. When she talks, people quiet and listen. However, here in the ground things do not seem so nice. IDPs continue to flee violence in Masisi and the FDLR claims to be hitting hard the FARDC.

This does not mean, though, that Braeckmann´s story is wrong. The problem is that governance is so poor in the DRC that the gap between the macro level and the reality on the ground is enormous. The weakest the state is, the longest it takes for decissions to be put into practice.

Joseph Kabila was recently here, and so did Ban Ki Moon. These visits, together with recent events and articles like Braeckmann´s, let us dream that the discussions taking place behind doors can really change the scenario, for good and forever. Sounds like Alice in wonderland, but having a black president in the white house sounded like that only two years ago, so… Let´s see.

This being said, no matter how much silence good diplomacy needs, no one knows what is being/has been discussed. Not very democratic as a process for a country considering itself as the champion of freedom.

(Found in Stealth Conflicts)

Stealth Conflicts suggests this is the death toll comparison between the conflict in the DRC and the Palestine-Israeli conflict. I am sure that this estimation (based on known figures) is very close to the real figure.

We live in a globalized world, where any information shows up on a webpage in a matter of minutes. But the DRC rarely appears in the frontpage of the most important newspapers. With its absence, the media are sending us a message: depending on where you are born, your life is worth more, or less.

This is so evidently unfair and painful.

My only hope is that, forty years from now, this scandal will be seen as a problem of the past. As a symptom of the problems of a society -our developed one- that, with time, changed for better. I hope to talk about it to my grandsons in the same way afroamerican grandparents talk nowadays about Rosa Parks. Like talking about an evident problem that finally, one day, one person dared to face. And changed for good.

We need our own Rosa Parks to raise this issue. I hope she will come soon.

Through words of its ambassador in the DRC, the US have publicly shown their full support for the joint military operation taking place in the Kivus. This kind of open declaration, and the way things are happening, can let us even think that plan the itself has been conceived by US diplomacy and proposed to Kigali and Kabila with a “you take it, or you take it” approach, soften with the idea of a “win-win” situation for everyone.

It seems that once the US speaks, the EU feels that it has to express itself on the matter.

Eurac, an influential European advocacy network, has expressed interesting recommendations on the current scenario, mainly advocating for less military muscle and more negotiation. This is not an easy thing to say now, though, because we are knowing  that the FDLR keeps on killing civilians. However, let´s make this clear: the FDLR are not the only negative forces in this war, no matter how many times Rwanda has tried to label them with this term. All armed groups involved in this war are more than negative (Filip Reytnjens expressed the spiral of violence in the Great Lakes region after the genocide with a very lucid sentence: “this is not a story of good guys fighting bad guys. This a story of bad guys”).

Following the on-going diplomatic plan, Rwanda affirmed yesterday what most Congolese citizens wanted to hear: that Rwandan troops will leave the country this same week. “Tomorrow [for today] they are going to issue (the orders). They will begin pulling back slowly,” a Rwandan spokesman said yesterday. He said that the withdrawal will be completed for next Wednesday.

The problem is: if Rwandan armed forces really leave, how are the FARDC suppose to hold their current position in the front line?

Many people in this part of the world remember the last time Rwandan forces left the Kivus. An expression was coined that time. People said that Rwandan soldiers “left through the main entrance and came back through the back window“. This is to say, they continued their presence in Congolese soil in a more disguised, but real, way. Many Congolese fear this could be the case again.

We have just received the visit of the representative of GNK (Gourvernorat du North Kivu) in one of the camps. GNK represents the government in the camp and are basically in charge of registering the population in the camps, the people arriving and leaving, the births and deceases, among others. He has told me that 35 menages (families of 4 members) arrived to one of the camps today, and 74 did two days ago. They are coming from Katoyi, in Masisi region. He has heard that many others are on their way towards Goma.

OCHA talks about it in their weekly press release.

It is almost one month since the Rwandan armed forces entered North Kivu to fight the FDLR. In spite of the dimension of the joint military operation RAF-CNDP-FARDC, little is known. People wonder what is happening in the field (specially the IDPs, whose return depend to a great extent on the success of this operation). Even though some local authorities (like the former governor of North Kivu, Eugene Serufuli) have visited the camps to encourage the ÌDPs to return, people remain very cautious.

Truth is the first casualty in a war, specially in one to which access is difficult. For the time being, we have been told that the joint forces have taken Nyabiondo and Kashebere, in Masisi and Walikale areas, and the FDLRs are fleeing towards Orientale province. Both parties (Rwanda and the DRC) are fighting to regain full control of Walikale area, where the richest mines in the DRC are found. People wonder if there is a hidden deal about them.

Casualty figures given (like here and here) can not be taken into consideration for the time being. A week ago, an IDP who knows someone who had came from Masisi that same day told me the FDLR was kicking the ass to the RAF.  But it is not easy to confirm it.

Rumours in Goma, though, say it is not being an easy task  for the RAF. The FDLR has proved not to be weak and MANY Rwandan soldiers (some witnesses say it seemed like the whole Rwandan army entering) have entered into Congolese soil, with combat helicopters crossing the skies of Goma towards Masisi. It is clear that this is not an operation like any other for Rwanda: the military effort is maximum.

In the meantime, president Sarkozy has declared that dismembering the DRC is out his plans, and balkanisation is a word being  used more and more around here. Even though there is a Congolese obsession about blaming the outside… something is rotten in the state of Denmark.

Global Witness recently wrote to major mobile phone manufacturers as well as mineral and metal traders to ask them what due diligence measures they are taking to ensure that their sourcing practices are not fuelling the conflict. While some firms have pledged to tighten their supply chain control, the mobile phone industry as a whole lacks sufficient measures to guarantee that phones and other electronics are free of conflict minerals.

Read more here.

HRW informs today that  the FDLR slaughtered at least 100 Congolese civilians in the Kivus between January 20 and February 8, 2009.

In Remeka village in Ufamandu, the FDLR rebels called a meeting at which they accused the population, local leaders and the Mai Mai armed group with whom they had been allied, of having betrayed them. A local resident present at the meeting said the FDLR told residents they would not be allowed to leave and that they were “sharpening their spears and machetes.” Another said, “The FDLR told us that if they were shot at by anyone that they would hold us responsible and kill us.”

Following the meeting, the FDLR erected barriers to prevent people from fleeing. When some tried to flee, the FDLR attacked them, killing dozens with guns, rocket-propelled grenades, and machetes. “As I ran, I saw bodies everywhere – men, women and children,” said one witness. “They had all been killed by the FDLR.”

FDLR combatants also raped more than a dozen women whom they accused of having joined the government side against them. For instance, in southern Masisi territory (North Kivu), on January 27, FDLR combatants raped and killed a woman and then raped her 9-year-old daughter.

The message given at the Remeka meeting was repeated in a letter sent from the FDLR to the governor of South Kivu in early February. In the letter, the group warned that if the local population collaborated with the Rwandan army they would be considered the FDLR’s “mortal enemy” and treated as a “belligerent party.”

Read the full text here.

Those who have been following closely the war in North Kivu will remember general Vicente Díaz de Villegas. General Díaz was named Commander in Chief of the MONUC forces on October 4th, 2008. He resigned only three weeks later, just a few days before the CNDP offensive towards Goma on October 29th. Many international staff evacuated Goma that day (me included). The following days, many people wondered why General Díaz had resigned. But his lips remained sealed and acces to him in Spain was forbidden to journalists.

Díaz, a Spanish citizen, was pictured by many UN staff in Congo as a coward who did not have the guts to face the responsibility. In sharp contrast, many Congolese applauded his resignation and portrayed him as a man of principles.

His resignation has remained a mistery since then.

It was only today that the Spanish newspaper El País published an extract of the confidential report that Díaz de Villegas sent to the DPKO headquarters in New York.

Villegas was formed in the Spanish Legion (home of the fiercest soldiers of the Spanish army) and in the Spanish Special Operations Forces. He was commander in chief of the first Spanish contingent in Kosovo in 1999, and he also served in Afganistan in 2005. These credentials do not seem those of a coward. He arrived a few days after MONUC and the government of Kinshasa had signed the Plan of the Separation, which in practical terms meant that a demilitarized zone would be created and MONUC and the FARDC would face CNDP in the field of battle:

These are some extracts of Díaz´s report (translated from Spanish):

“In my opinion, the plan was a clear example of a mission creep. The idea was to put military pressure over an armed group through offensive actions. MONUC did not have neither the mandate nor the capacity to take those. In fact, the plan was completely divorced from reality”.

According to the Spanish newspaper, general Díaz visited MONUC´s positions in Kanyabayonga and Sake, here in North Kivu; Millembwe and Wallangu, in South Kivu; and Kamatsi and Bogory, in Ituri.

“My first impression of these visits”, General Díaz continues, “confirmed the quality of the soldiers under my command, but also the limited operational capacity of the force. After a detailed analysis with my Head of Staff (the very reliable French general Eric Arnaud), I concluded that the force lacked flexibility and mobility. The units could only react to protect civilians in the main towns and axes. In the rest of the country, they had to limit themselves to self protection”.

We will always remember Kiwanja as the best example of this analysis. When CNDP´s forces massacred more than 150 civilians, MONUC´s blue helmets in Kiwanja remained in their barracks, at literally a throw of stone of the atrocities.

“There were no risk or threat evaluation procedures”, Díaz affirms regarding MONUC. “Security plans needed to be reviewed. There was no plan to gather information and there were no reinforcements”.

This is to say: if an isolated MONUC unit was in danger, no reinforcements could be send to help them. According to Díaz´s report, there were not even medical supplies or ammonition for the MONUC offensive.

According to this situation, and considering that Nkunda did not want to deploy the weapons, the only possibility for the plan to succeed was that the CNDP wererapidly defeated by a joint offensive of MONUC and the Congolese Army. Otherwise, General Díaz affirms, “the reaction could be potentially catastrophic”. (…) If they were able to resist the first attack or launch a counteroffensive, the UN troops would become an objective. The main headquarters [of the blue helmets] could resist, but those less protected would risk a great danger”. (…) Massive population displacements would take place and acts of violence by all parties defeated, no matter who they may be, together with reprisals by the winning factions, would create the scenario of possible massacres”.

Díaz de Villegas correctly understood the power of CNDP, and he also understood that MONUC and FARDC together could not defeat them. He tried to convince Alan Doss that the plan had to be delayed, but Doss left him no choice. After months doing almost nothing since he arrived from Liberia, the heat made Doss finally move…. but it was too late. And once he had moved, after months of passiveness, he could not stop again because the just arrived new Commander in Chief was asking him to do so.

If the forces had been equipped accordingly much before the situation heated, Díaz would not have found himself in that situation. So Díaz payed for MONUC´s lack of prevision.

“I had just arrived, I was just landing and gathering information about the mission when suddenly its nature changed abruptly to assume a dangerously offensive character, without taking into consideration my opinion but under my responsibility. When authority and responsibility are dissociated, it is better to resign”. The last sentence is very clear: no matter what may happen in the field, the responsibility would be his and not Doss.

“As a military proffessional who has served in combat and peacekeeping operations, and aware of the sad precedents of UNPROFOR [the mission in Bosnia that could not stop the killing of 8,000 civilians in Srebrenica] and ONUSOM II [the failed US intervention in Somalia], I felt that resigning was my duty in order to attract the attention and not to assume the responsibility of the potential consequences [of applying the Plan of Separation]”.

Due to his decision to resign, Díaz de Villegas lost his third star and, as a result, was sent to the reserve last January 18^th.

His report ends with this words: “I knew that no one was going to like my decission. And I paid a high personal price for it. But it was my duty as an officer.. I owed honesty to my subordinates and loyalty to my superiors. I had no choice”.

Source: United Nations Security Council

Date: 27 Jan 2009

Letter dated 27 January 2009 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2009/52)

I have the honour to refer to the additional capacities for the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) which the Security Council authorized by its resolution 1843 (2008 ) of 20 November 2008 and which it recalled in its resolution 1856 (2008 ) of 22 December 2008.

I regret to inform you that, despite the Organization’s considerable efforts to generate the additional resources required, in particular through consultations in New York and in a number of capitals, troop-contributing countries have not been as receptive as we had hoped. In all, 49 troop contributors and 12 potential troop contributors have been asked to provide the Mission with the additional troops and resources authorized. The need for robust and highly mobile troops was particularly emphasized. Four countries that are contributing police personnel have also been approached.

The United Nations accepted an official proposal from Bangladesh to provide one infantry battalion, one engineer company and one formed police unit, as well as a proposal from Belgium to provide a C-130 aircraft to the Mission. In addition, five Member States have agreed to send the required intelligence experts to MONUC, albeit without providing the necessary equipment.

Four Member States have expressed interest in providing the second authorized battalion, while two others might provide the two special forces companies. Another Member State indicated that it might be able to provide the second formed police unit. Finally, I received a letter from the Economic Community of Central African States indicating that its member countries were willing to provide certain capacities to the Mission. The Secretariat will continue to assess the expressions of interest that most closely match the Mission’s resource requirements. While these expressions of interest are positive, I nevertheless have some concerns to communicate to the Security Council. More than two months after the adoption of resolution 1843 (2008), no formal offers have been made in response to these requests. I am especially concerned about the lack of formal offers of special forces companies.

Equally worrisome is the fact that there have been no commitments or expressions of interest regarding the remaining air assets (one C-130 and 18 utility helicopters) or the deployment of the 200 military training instructors/advisers needed. These resources are essential for the Mission’s mobility and rapid reaction capacity, which are vital if it is to fulfil the mandate set out by the Security Council.

Given the need to deploy the additional resources authorized for MONUC as soon as possible, I would like to renew my appeal to those troop- and policecontributing countries that have the necessary capacities to enable the Mission to discharge its mandate effectively, pursuant to resolution 1856 (2008). I will keep the Security Council regularly informed of the efforts made in this regard.

In the meantime, any efforts by the Security Council to encourage troopcontributing countries to provide the Mission with the necessary resources would be greatly appreciated.

Indeed, according to several of its members, the mission found out that the ruling Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) had been too efficient in intimidating the voters and fixing the ballot, as it obtained 98.39% of the vote. This observation is based on a very robust sample size of 24.96% of the total vote (which gives a standard error for the smallest sample of under one percent). Realising that this result looked too “Stalinist”, the regime modified the results: officially the RPF obtained 78.76%, and two other parties were credited with 13.13% (PSD) and 7.50% (PL). Although the mission is fully aware of this manipulation, it is not mentioned  in the report, which is thus as fake as the elections it pretends to analyse.

This is the kind of news that disencourage any decent person interested in becoming an EU electoral observer.

Find the full Reyntjens text here. The EU report can be found on the Observer Mission’s website: www.eueomrwanda.org

I have just come across a revealing interview to the British Foreign Secretary, David Miliband, on the BBC. I don´t know when exactly it was on air, probably a few weeks ago.

After a few questions, the journalist, John Humphreys, goes to the point asking Miliband on the plundering of natural ressources and the interest of multinationals “who want the stuff coming out of Congo”, in Humphreys lucid words. Milliband´s reflexes on the following hot questions deserve an analysis.

First, Miliband predictably fingers to the neighbours as those responsible for the war:

MILIBAND: Well, I think the most proximate… raiders, if you like, on the riches of the Congo have actually been forces from neighbouring countries rather than multinationals…

HUMPHREYS: And they have to sell the stuff to someone, don´t they?

MILIBAND: They do, you are right, and the economics of this are important, but as we remember from 19…

HUMPHREYS: Vital, rather than important…

As fingering neighbours does not work, he (quite predictably again) goes for the ethnic explanation of the conflict:

MILIBAND: Well, hang on, hang on… with respect, anyone who remembers the 1990s knows that there is an ethnic dimension to this as well…

HUMPHREYS: Not in this one. Not in this one, this is different, isn´t it?

MILIBAND: Well, I don´t think you can say that John, I wish it was true but actually Mr Nkunda represents… what he believes is that the tutsi faction.. the FDLR is a force that needs to be dispanded, is a rebel hutu force, so it does have an ethnic dimension.

Miliband then goes for the next predictable argument: “the conflict is not as easy as it may seem, it is very complex”. And he´s right. But he knows very well that, at the same time, the plundering issue is currently at the core of it.

Later, Humphreys goes for the next hot potato: when the UN released the report of the panel of experts ( I guess he means the one of 2003), the UK basically asked the UN to bury the issue. Miliband dribbles the comment as the expert politician he is. Humphreys strikes back and stresses that there can not be political stability if the countrys is being plundered. And then Miliband says the following:

MILIBAND: No, no, it´s being plundered because there is not enough security in the country. There isn´t security in the country because the goverment of the DRC does not run right across the country. It does not run right across the country because there are rebel groups (…)

But the logical sequence stops. The next sentence should have been: “There are rebel groups because…” . But that would mean entering a hot territory for discussion.

Humphreys strikes again: “If multinational corporations were not buying the stuff they plunder, they would not be operating the way they are! That´s the root of it! and it has been for generations in Congo“.

And, in order to avoid the issue once more, Miliband replies with an academic answer (there is no more time for questions):

MILIBAND: No, the root of it the search for power, partly economic power, but also political power in the Congo. It is not as simple as you say. And even if it was true it still needs a security settlement and a political settlement. That is the key point.

…for a diplomatic solution.

Hence, as we listen, the key issues regarding all this can only be openly discussed behind closed doors, not in public.We know that is the current situation in the DRC and Rwanda. However, the UK is supposed to be a democracy, isn´t it?

That´s the way diplomacy works, Miliband may answer.

I would like to think that we can trust him. Because one thing is for sure: we don´t know what they are doing.

“Global Witness investigations have revealed that all the main armed groups in eastern DRC, as well as the Congolese army, are financing themselves via the trade in minerals and metals such as cassiterite (tin ore), gold, coltan and wolframite. Breaking this link between armed conflict and illicit resource plunder is critical to bringing peace to the region”.

Read more here.

To read Alan Doss´ letter to Global Witness, click here.

A few days ago, I had a very long and illustrative talk with a Congolese expert on the  politics in the DRC.

Before, he told me, he was aware of what was going on. He basically got the information, and according to it he could foresee what was going to happen. These days, he does not know what is happening. Like anyone else interested in the war in North Kivu, he can only try to understand the current situation on the basis of the news, interpreting the chain of events and making his own deductions.

According to him, only four people really know what has been agreed  between Rwanda and the DRC: the president of Rwanda, Paul Kagame; the president of the DRC, Joseph Kabila, the Congolese general John Numbi, former chief of the Congolese Air Force and nowadays DRC Police Inspector General; and the Chief of General Staff of the Rwandan Armed Forces, James Kabarebe. To these men we could add a few of the highest officials from the governments of the US, the UK and France.

The visit of James Kavarebe to Kinshasa on January 8th, very much rejected by the Congolese public opinion, can be seen now as the turning point for the current scenario.

The opacity in the decission making is extreme. It´s not only that the Congolese governors do not know what is happening. The Congolese ministers themselves were not informed about the agreement with Rwanda.

As a result, the destiny of sixty million Congolese and an extremely relevant issue  for the future of ten million Rwandans is being decided leaving absolutely every citizen aside. It is completely undemocratic.

Only five months ago, Paul Kagame used strong words agains Joseph Kabila in La Libre Belgique. Now, they are working together. Only huge international pressure can explain that.

Now that the hunt of the FDLR has started, people wonder what will be the future of Walikale, the richest mining region in North Kivu. This is an area controlled by the 85th Congolese Batallion and the FDLR. Will they be sweeped? No one knows if this is part of the deal.

Another issue is the weight of the Rwandan army in the operation. Rwanda has publicly annonunced the “observer” nature of their forces in Kivu. However, everyone knows the real capabilities of the FARDC. It can hardly be called an army. And from one day to another, they are supposed to be capable to face the FDLR. Everyone knows who is carrying the military weight of the operation.

Many of us fear the humanitarian consequences of the military operation. The FDLRs have been living in Congo for fifteen years, have mixed with the population, have had children… As a relevant Congolese authority recently said, referring to the presence of FDLR in North Kivu: if you mix salt and sugar, how are you supposed to separate both again?

The expert I talked to agreed on the fact that a lot more than what we actually know has been dealed. But no one knows the real terms. Only the four men mentioned above… and a few others whose names we don´t know.

Last Friday, Chris McGreal provided a very comprehensive analysis of the recent events in The Guardian. Together with Foreign Policy, the Guardian points to diplomatic pressure pushing the deal, specially after Kiwanja and the Stearns report:

Kagame’s closest allies overseas, the US and Britain, which provide the bulk of Rwanda’s foreign aid and a lot of diplomatic cover, quietly made clear that the conflict in eastern Congo had to be brought to an end.

However, as Jason Stearns said last Friday on the NYT, Nkunda’s arrest  is part of a broader realignment. As he underlines, the unknowns  and risks over the horizon are many.

Congo-belgian diplomatic relations are normalized again, obviously boosted by recent events.

I fear the humanitarian consequences of the military operations. FDLRs live within the population. How are they supposed to find them? The military objectives of the mission are not realistic.

As David Lewis wonders,

How will a handful of Rwandans help Congo’s notoriously weak forces disarm the FDLR in 10-15 days after Kigali’s army failed to do the job during several years of occupation?

According to Father Luigi,

Dire que la guerre est finie ou dire que le long calvaire des populations du Kivu est terminé, c’est peut etre trés prematuré. Personne fait rien pour rien. Si les Rwandais ont accepté d’attaquer Nkunda conjointement avec les FARDC, ne l’on pas fait gratuitement. Les propos de Sarkozy c’est le dur prix que la RDC doit payer.

And according to Colette Braeckman (who is more pessimistic),

Les jours à venir verront sans doute un nouveau triomphe de la realpolitik, la morale n’y trouvera pas son compte, ni la lutte contre l’impunité. Mais si la paix enfin se dessine, fragile et minée par les compromis et les compromissions, ces scrupules seront sans doute vite effacés…

There are four thousand Rwandan soldiers in North Kivu according to OCHA , six thousand according to MISNA. FARDC forces are starting their advance .

Kinshasa has probably taken this step under big international pressure. But it is also a bet. If it works out, the war will be over. However, many Congolese consider that the price is too high, even if it works out.  If this is the only solution to pacify North Kivu, I wonder if other provinces with a history of secessionist aspirations (i.e Katanga) could see this scenario as a window of opportunity.

All the media confirm that Laurent Nkunda has been arrested by Rwandan armed forces.

Hence it was true: Nkunda´s political fate was in peril during the last months.

The release of the UN Stearns Report and the subsequent known international pressure (remember Netherlands and Sweden´s position) has played a role. The major pressure though (that exercised by the US Department of State, the UK, France and China) does not appear in the media. No public reactions yet by them (will there be any?).

The news stress the idea of recent events as an strictly internal (Congolese- Rwandese) affair. The message is: major international stakeholders are completely aside from all this.

This is a very hard sell.

Meanwhile, the number of Rwandan soldiers in Congolese soil continues to grow, and the humanitarian community fears more and more for the consequences of the joint military operation starting in North Kivu.

“This marks a major turning point in Kinshasa’s attitude toward the conflict in the east. It appears (President Joseph) Kabila’s government has decided to turn on what has been an ally, the FDLR.”

“This marks a serious change in Rwanda’s policy as well. For the first time since 2002, Rwandan troops are on Congolese soil.”

“They will now be working together against the FDLR, while the CNDP (Tutsi rebel group), which in the past has received support from Rwanda, will now join ranks with the Congolese army.

“This strategy hinges on the success of the military operations against the FDLR. These kinds of counter-insurgency operations are very difficult and always carry with them the risk of serious harm to the civilian population.”

“The other risk is that these operations could be protracted and Kinshasa has already gone out on a limb inviting back in what has been traditionally perceived as its biggest enemy.”

Not to miss the following Reuter´s dispatch.

Approximately 2,000 Rwandan soldiers have entered North Kivu this morning through Kibumba. Their deployment is part of an agreement with the government of the DRC to put an end to the presence of FDLR soldiers in the province.

Too many things are happening these days.

As events evolve, I have more and more the feeling of a resource sharing agreement getting real between Rwanda and the DRC. If you can not beat your enemy, join it. Specially if this is the only way you have to receive all the taxes you should be getting for mineral exports. And also if you are under international pressure to find a diplomatic solution.  Many Congolese will not be happy with this.

The BBC says that diplomatic and UN sources fear a humanitarian disaster because of a possible lack of military planning and consultation with the international community.

I very much doubt that the key international players have not been consulted. However, the lack of military planning seems clear. I was just talking to someone who came back this afternoon from Rutshuru, and CNDP forces around there were not aware of  the Rwandan deployment.

Meanwhile, the CNDP-Nkunda branch has declared their support to the military operation.

A military solution for the FDLR problem has therefore started, and the scenarios are multiple. How long will Rwandan forces remain in the territory? What will be the humanitarian consequences for the people of North Kivu?

But, above all: Will this make things better, or worse?

***

Addendum: CNDP´s taxes have completely stopped. This is great news for the people of Goma, as prices -specially food- will go down in following days.

A rumour circulating in Goma says that Bosco Ntaganda may have received 2,000.000 U$ as part of his agreement. Rumours are rumours. But it would make sense.

A friend just informed me about a very interesting article appeared last month in The New York Times. The text is signed by Herman J. Cohen, the US assistant secretary of state for Africa from 1989 to 1993. Cohen proposes a  realistic economic solution to the conflict (supported by many): basically, sharing the cake among all actors involved.

Congolese activists have already replied to this approach, considering it as the international acceptance of a territorial aggression.

Meanwhile, the French president, Nicolas Sarkozy, recently made public France´s diplomatic plans in the region, interestingly in line with the the views expressed by Cohen.

Today I´ve been asking several people what they think about the new prospects of peace announced in the media. The word that describes better what everyone has answered is mistrust, scepticism at best. People don´t trust there will be a real change, at least in the short term.

The record of broken peace deals in the region is quite big, and they all remember several situations like this in the past, where politicians and military where saying this is over… and two days later things started again.

Then why it should be different this time, people wonders.

The issue is not only that former peace deals were broken, but that the reasons for it -the deal-  is neither public not clear. That pushes scepticism as much as former broken peace deals.

A friend of mine told me today that in this country the highest criminals are not prosecuted… but rewarded. Many congolese would agree with this. And this is extremely harmful for the health of any society.

This morning I was doing some shopping in the market district (Birere) when a big number of taximotos started to pass by. They may be more than one hundred, many of them claxoning. It looked like a motorbike demonstration, and I asked the shop owner what was happening.

He told me: “the radio says the war is over”.

It is too early to affirm something like this, simply because we are in the Great Lakes region. However, the latest news let us be optimistic. Ntaganda faction has announced the end of fighting. And right after him, the head of PARECO has moved on the same direction.

What makes this news really powerful, though, is the fact that Ntaganda´s declaration of peace has been signed in Goma, in front of the Congolese Interior Minister and, more importantly, in front of Rwanda’s armed forces commander. This is big news, because it publicly shows with whom of the two (Nkunda and Ntaganda) Rwanda is. The bad news is,  the split inside CNDP is a reality, and Laurent Nkunda remains silent.

What is Laurent Nkunda going to do? Pressure mounts against him. Does he have the military capacity to continue fighting without Rwanda and Bosco´s faction? It does not seem to be the case.

The real question behind all this is why. What´s the deal?

“Anything that doesn’t end in the arrest of Bosco Ntaganda is in flagrant violation of international law,” Human Rights Watch has repeteadly say. Is Ntaganda´s freedom part of the deal?

The first thing that comes to my mind while I write these lines is: you help us clean the field of FDLR´s and we guarantee that you will not end like Jean Pierre Bemba.

But… what else is the prize to pay for peace?

I have just received a report from the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) on the information meeting they hold this morning in Goma.

For anyone interested, all their information can be found here.

According to relevant sources, CNDP´s pressure towards Internally Displaced People (IDPs) in Kiwanja has severely increased. In the last two weeks, soldiers have been asking IDPs to pay 2 U$ per day as a “tax to remain in the IDP camp”. Things are going far beyond. CNDP soldiers are threatening men, women and children to occupy their homes if they do not return home. Some of the houses have been seized, and padlocks have been placed in some visible door entrances to increase pressure.

As readers of this blog know, IDPs remain in the camp of Kiwanja because they fear for their lives.

Meanwhile, there are many informations regarding an acute increase of human rights violations in three territories under CNDP control:  Kitchanga, Mweso and Kirolire. According to sources, the lack of discipline showed by CNDP soldiers in these areas is related to the leave of high ranking CNDP officials towards Rutshuru.

Je crois qu’il y a une volonté du général Bosco Ntaganda de s’émanciper. Ce n’est pas la première fois que cela se produit. L’année dernière, il y a déjà eu deux rumeurs faisant état d’une scission au sein du CNDP. La première, début 2008, annonçait la formation de deux nouveaux mouvements rebelles dissidents du CNDP dont l’un serait dirigé par Ntaganda et l’autre par Matienga. La deuxième date de fin septembre début décembre, et faisait état de la mort de Nkunda. Mais là, ce n’est plus une rumeur, c’est la première crise majeure que connait le mouvement. Ntaganda affiche clairement ses intentions. On s’oriente clairement vers une scission mais la situation est encore confuse pour le moment. On ne sait pas qui est avec qui. Il est tout à fait évident que les autres belligérants du conflit dans le Nord Kivu pourraient profiter de ce clash au sein du CNDP.

(…)

Personne n’a la situation en main. La situation est encore confuse. Laurent Nkunda a tenté de jouer la carte d’apaisement mais cela n’a pas marché. Comme je le disais tantôt, on ne sait pas, pour l’heure, qui est avec qui. C’est sûr qu’il va se passer des choses dans les jours à venir, il y a réellement un problème. Mais je crois que le mouvement politique est encore en grande majorité acquis à Laurent Nkunda.

Read more here.

It was cold in Goma last night. Cold even for the standard of someone sleeping in a good room with two blankets.

It is hard to think about how tens of thousands of men, women and children spent the last night in the camps. To make things worse, few have enough wood for heating. And to make things worse, they have to be very careful by doing so. If your sheeting gets burned, you will never get a new one. Everyone knows that.

The rain also came early in the morning.

This view of Buhimba IDP camp was taken yesterday.

With prices for most base metals currently at two-thirds of their earlier peaks, and futures contracts being exchanged at or below their marginal cost of production, any hopes of reviving the country’s long-dormant mining industry have now largely evaporated. Most of the 61 foreign mining companies which returned to the country after the 1998-2003 conflict – including Sicomin, the Sino-Congolese joint venture – have been forced to scale back, postpone or abandon their investment plans: Katanga Mining, Anvil Mining, and the Central African Mining and Exploration Company (Camec) have already suspended some copper and cobalt operations, and further shutdowns are expected. BHP Billiton has announced its intention to withdraw from two diamond exploration agreements, forcing its joint venture junior partners to consider following suit.

Read more here. For more information on Oxford Analytica, click here.